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 Broadly speaking there are two kinds of phenomena the ethics of forgetting 
is concerned with. First, there are the moral and legal ramifi cations of the 
fact that we sometimes forget about our past wrongdoings. Consider two 
agents accused of the same kind of wrongdoing. One agent has suffered 
memory loss, albeit through no fault of his own, and cannot remember 
anything about the action he is accused of. In this case, the forgetting 
may be used as evidence of incompetence to stand trial or in mitigation of 
criminal and moral responsibility. The other agent intentionally brought 
about the memory loss (say, by taking a forgetting pill) before committing 
the wrongdoing. The voluntary nature of his forgetting has the consequence 
that it does not mitigate his responsibility ( Birch, 2000 ). This suggests that 
whether the fact that an agent has forgotten about his past wrongdoing can 
be used as an excuse for a wrongdoing crucially depends on whether the 
forgetting was brought about intentionally and voluntary. 
 Besides the moral assessment of past wrongdoings the agent has forgotten 
about, there is the moral assessment of the harm an agent brings about 
as a consequence of forgetting something. This is the issue the chapter is 
concerned with. There are at least two ways in which forgetting might 
be harmful. Sometimes it is the forgetting itself that constitutes the harm. 
For instance, it is common for your partner to feel hurt if you forget her 
birthday and for a close friend to be upset if you forget his name. People 
expect to be remembered by those who are important to them. The fact that 
you forget your partner’s birthday is taken as evidence that the partner is 
not suffi ciently important to you. Besides cases where the forgetting itself 
constitutes the harm there are cases where forgetting gives rise to another 
event that, in turn, constitutes the harm. An example of the latter kind is a 
baby suffering from a heat stroke because it was forgotten inside a parked 
car on a hot day. 
 The moral assessment of harm caused by forgetting crucially depends on 
whether the forgetting is brought about intentionally or unintentionally. 
If the memory loss is brought about unintentionally, the harmed person 
is usually upset, but when the memory loss is intentional and voluntary 
the harmed person often feels anger and resentment directed toward the 
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forgetting subject ( Driver, 2009 , pp. 84–85). This is nicely illustrated in 
the movie  Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind where the protagonist 
Joel (Jim Carrey) realizes that his ex-girlfriend Clementine (Kate Winslet) 
chose to undergo a memory erasure procedure offered by Lacuna, Inc., 
to overcome the pain of their breakup. The technicians at Lacuna wiped 
out all memories of Joel and of their prior relationship. Joel feels betrayed 
by Clementine’s intentional memory zap. But since he wants to give their 
relationship another chance he too undergoes the memory erasure process. 
Joel asks Lacuna, Inc., to not only erase all of his memories of Clementine 
and of his relationship with her but also his memories of the feeling of 
betrayal upon learning that she decided to erase her memories of him. 
 In this chapter, I argue that forgetting has ethical impact in three ways. 
First, psychological studies show that we sometimes have control over for-
getting. Hence the claim that we cannot be morally responsible for forgetting 
because forgetting is outside of our control is based on a misunderstand-
ing of the psychology of forgetting. Once this psychology is understood 
it becomes apparent that there are instances in which we do have control 
over our forgetting and are therefore morally responsible for harm brought 
about as a consequence of forgetting something. 
 The second claim concerns instances in which we have control over our 
ability to remember something at a later point in time. We can learn, for 
instance, that as an individual we are bad at remembering people’s names 
and birthdays. Our awareness of this fact should prompt us to take extra 
steps to improve our memories regarding names and birthdays. When we fail 
to take these extra steps and then forget, we are morally responsible. This 
type of moral responsibility is similar to the moral responsibility someone 
who intentionally got drunk bears for doing regrettable acts while drunk. 
 The third claim concerns instances where we have neither control over our 
forgetting something nor control over our ability to remember something. 
Intuitively a person can be morally responsible for forgetting something 
even if it is beyond her control that she forgets that thing and even if she 
did everything that can be reasonably expected of her to remember that 
thing. The literature on culpable ignorance contains two accounts of 
the blameworthiness of cases of forgetting over which the agent has no 
control: attributionism and the liberalized awareness condition of moral 
responsibility. Rather than playing one account off against the other, I will 
give a neutral assessment of their strengths and weaknesses. 
 Section 1 distinguishes between two kinds of forgetting: trace decay 
and interference. Section 2 reviews the two standard conditions for moral 
responsibility: the control condition and the awareness condition. Section 3 
draws on work in the psychology of forgetting to argue that there are things 
an agent can do to actively forget something. The picture whereupon, in 
principle, it is beyond a person’s control whether she forgets something 
does not hold up to scrutiny. Section 4 discusses the tracing account of 
wrongdoing due to forgetting. On the tracing account, the blameworthiness 
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of the forgetting can be traced back to an intentional action the agent 
performed earlier. The point of Section 4 is to argue that not all cases of 
blameworthy forgetting can be captured by the tracing account. Section 5 
is a critical discussion of an attempt to explain the blameworthiness of 
nontracing cases of forgetting in terms of a liberalized awareness condition 
of moral responsibility. Section 6 is a critical discussion of the attributionist 
explanation of the blameworthiness of nontracing cases of forgetting. 
Section 7 contains some concluding remarks. 
 1 Theories of Forgetting 
 Forgetting in long-term memory indicates that an item of information that 
was once learned is either permanently lost or temporarily inaccessible. 1
According to the  decay theory , forgetting occurs as a result of traces in long-
term memory declining in strength with time. The competing  interference 
theory states that what causes forgetting is the disruption and obscuration 
of memory traces by preceding or succeeding learning. Interference manifest 
itself in two ways: when previous learning interferes with later learning and 
retention it is called  proactive interference; when later learning disrupts 
memory for earlier learning it is called  retroactive interference (cf.  Baddeley, 
2014 ,  ch. 6 ). 
 It has proven diffi cult to experimentally verify the automatic degeneration 
of memory traces postulated by the decay theory. One of the problems is that 
in any real-life situation the time between learning something and recalling 
will be fi lled with all kinds of different events. It is therefore impossible to 
rule out that any forgetting that takes place between leaning and recall is 
the result of trace decay rather than interference effects. On the other hand, 
there is solid experimental support for the interference theory by means 
of paired-associate learning. 2 This may explain why, for many years, the 
interference theory was the majority view. But even though the interference 
theory has been supported in numerous studies it is not clear to what extend 
the fi ndings from paired-associate learning in a laboratory setting can be 
applied to forgetting in everyday life. So even though decay (indexed by 
time) and interference (indexed by amount of distracting information) 
have historically been viewed as competing accounts of forgetting there is 
a recent tendency to view them as complementary processes.  Hardt, Nader, 
and Nadel (2013 ), for instance, argue that in certain brain areas, notably 
the hippocampus, interference-driven forgetting is minimal and decay 
causes most forgetting; but in other brain areas it is the other way round ( cf. 
Altmann & Gray, 2002 ). 
 When a piece of information is forgotten due to the relevant trace having 
disappeared, it is permanently gone. When forgetting occurs because of 
interference, it is sometimes possible that the memory comes back if the 
agent is provided with the appropriate retrieval cue. So while forgetting 
due to trace decay is permanent, forgetting due to interference may be only 
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temporal. From a fi rst-person point of view, it is usually indistinguishable 
whether a memory item is merely inaccessible or whether it has been deleted. 
 In this chapter, I focus on cases of forgetting where the relevant infor-
mation is still stored in the memory system and could be retrieved if the 
appropriate retrieval cues were provided. My reasons are two-fold. First, 
interference-driven forgetting happens much more frequently than decay-
based forgetting. Even a forgotten item of information 
 can typically be recognized at a rate that greatly exceeds chance lev-
els, can be relearned at an accelerated rate, and can often be recalled 
in special circumstances that reinstate certain cues from the past—all 
of which constitute evidence that such items have not been lost from 
memory in any absolute sense. 
 ( Bjork & Vanhuele, 1992 : 156, as cited in 
 Michaelian, 2011 , pp. 403–404) 
 Second, the ethical implications of forgetting due to inaccessibility (and 
interference) seem to be more interesting than those of forgetting that takes 
the form of trace elimination. In other words, it seems more promising to 
try to prevent interference from rendering certain memory items inaccessible 
than to try to stop the decay of a particular memory trace. 
 2 Two Components of Moral Responsibility 
 Intuitively there are two kinds of conditions that can be used to excuse 
oneself from moral responsibility: ignorance of the nature of one’s action 
and lack of control over one’s action. Consequently, the standard account 
of moral responsibility lists two necessary conditions: a control condition 
and an awareness condition. 
 The control condition specifi es the type and degree of control the agent 
needs to have over her action for her to be morally responsible for it. A crude 
form of the control condition states: 
Control Condition : S is morally responsible for performing (not 
performing) action A only if it is within S’s power to perform (not to 
perform) A. 
 A lot of ink has been spilled over the question of whether the kind of control 
required for moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism. For 
the purpose of this chapter we can put the issue of determinism to one side. 
 The awareness condition specifi es the type and degree of the agent’s 
awareness of the likely consequences of his action and its moral status for 
the attributability of moral responsibility. The idea is that an agent cannot 
be blamed for the harm she is causing if she is unaware, and has no reason to 
be aware, that her action risks or leads to harm. Given that blame responds 
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to contempt or the absence of concern for others, there is nothing in the 
mental life of an ignorant agent that could be the proper object of blame; or 
so the standard conception of moral responsibility claims. 3 
 The awareness condition of moral responsibility is said to have two 
components. The fi rst component states that an agent can be held responsible 
for doing something only when she is aware that she is doing it. And since 
an action may be intentional under some description and unintentional 
under another ( Anscombe, 1957 , pp. 11–12) the agent needs to be aware of 
what she is doing under the appropriate description. The second component 
of the awareness condition states that the agent can be held responsible for 
doing something only when she is aware of why she is doing it. In other 
words, it is a condition on moral responsibility that the psychological 
state that moves the agent to perform (or omit) some action matches the 
consideration that counts in favor of performing (or omitting) some action 
( Alfano, 2016 ). When both components are combined, we get a condition 
that looks something like this: 
 Awareness Condition : S is morally responsible for action A only if (i) S 
is aware of doing A (under the appropriate description) and (ii) S does 
A while believing that A is morally wrong (in the case of a blameworthy 
action) or permissible/obligatory (in the case of a praiseworthy action). 4
 Obviously, one cannot be aware of why one is doing what one is doing 
unless one is aware of what one is doing. I focus on the fi rst component of 
the awareness condition. The reason is that the main worry about blaming 
someone for forgetting something has to do with the agent not being aware 
of what she is doing, rather than with the agent not being aware of her 
motives. 5 
 The fact that we blame people who cause harm due to having forgotten 
something seems to fl y in the face of the standard conception of moral 
responsibility. It is commonly thought that forgetting is not under our 
control. But if forgetting is not under our control and if it is wrong to blame 
someone for something that they have no control over, then we ought not to 
blame someone for forgetting something, not even if the forgetting is harmful. 
Furthermore, forgetting does not seem to meet the awareness condition. The 
element of awareness commonly required for blameworthiness is absent in 
forgetting. If an agent has forgotten at t that  p , then she is  not aware at t of 
the likely consequences of not acting on the basis of  p . For if the agent  were
aware of the likely consequences of not acting on the basis of  p , then she 
would most likely act on the basis of  p . So how can an agent be responsible 
for an action she is not aware of performing? 6 
 The point of the chapter is that, contrary to what many people think, we 
can indeed be morally responsible for our forgetting. There are instances of 
forgetting where the control condition  is satisfi ed, either because we have 
control over our forgetting (Section 3) or because we have control over our 
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ability to remember at a later point in time (Section 4). Moreover, it seems 
that a person can be morally responsible for forgetting something even if it 
is beyond her control that she forgot that thing. The literature contains two 
accounts of the blameworthiness of forgetting over which the agent has no 
control. One of these accounts modifi es the awareness condition so that it 
is satisfi ed in some cases of forgetting (Section 5). The other account argues 
that neither awareness nor control are necessary for moral responsibility 
(Section 6). 
 3 Directed Forgetting 
 It is common to think that there are no techniques for forgetting specifi c 
items that are non-drastic in the sense of not signifi cantly diminishing one’s 
general epistemic competencies or abilities. 7 This rules out, among other 
things, forgetting as a result of infl icting a serious brain injury on oneself. 
This section discusses the possibility of non-drastic techniques for forgetting 
specifi c items in light of recent work in psychology. 
 There are a number of pharmacological tools available that can make 
us forget. Medications such as scopolamine, benzodiazepines, and kinase 
inhibitors have the proven effect of inducing amnesia. 8 While these 
medications, when they work properly, block memory consolidation 
altogether there are other medications, namely beta-blockers that merely 
dampen the strength of a memory by reducing both its emotional intensity 
as well as its factual richness. Beta-blockers such as propranolol can reduce 
the risk of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) without wiping out the 
memory in question. PTSD develops as a result of extensive amounts of stress 
hormones being released at the time of a traumatic event. When propranolol 
is taken shortly after a traumatic event this can disturb the consolidation of 
the traumatic memories and thus prevent the disorder from developing. 9 An 
advantage of propranolol over other amnesia-inducing medications is that 
it can be used to target specifi c items of information encoded in the memory 
system. 
 Arguably the most interesting method of forgetting is known as  directed 
forgetting . Directed forgetting is impaired memory arising from an instruc-
tion to forget a learned piece of information. In a typical directed forgetting 
experiment, subjects are presented with a list of words (list 1). After the pre-
sentation of list 1, one group of subjects is instructed to forget the words on 
the list. The other group of subjects is instructed to continue remembering 
the list. 10 Then both groups of subjects are presented a second list of words 
(list 2) and are asked to study the words. Next the subjects are asked to re-
call all of the previously presented items, including both to-be-forgotten and 
to-be-remembered words. These experiments show two things: fi rst, a for-
get-instruction leads to poorer memory for the targeted material (list 1) than 
a remember-instruction, and second a forget-instruction sometimes leads 
to better memory for materials learned following that instruction (list 2). 
15032-1019d-1pass-r02.indd   246 08-02-2018   23:20:05
On the Blameworthiness of Forgetting 247
These two effects are taken to be evidence for retrieval inhibition initiated 
by the forget-instruction ( Bjork, Bjork, & Anderson, 1998 ). The instruction 
to forget triggers inhibitory mechanisms that temporarily reduce the acces-
sibility of the to-be-forgotten information in memory, which explains why 
subjects who received the forget-instruction have a harder time to recall 
the words of list 1. Moreover, this inhibition reduces proactive interference 
from list 1 and thus facilitates retrieval of list 2 items. This is why subjects 
who have forgotten some of the words on list 1 remember more of the 
words of list 2 than the subjects who did not receive a forget-instruction and 
thus still remember more of the words of list 1. 11 
 Forget-instructions have been shown to work not only for lists of random 
words but also for autobiographical material. Regardless of the kind of 
material studied and regardless of its emotional valence, directed forgetting 
instructions are surprisingly effective. In an experiment conducted by 
Joslyn and Oakes (2005) participants in the group that received the forget-
instruction recalled approximately 24% fewer personal events from the 
previous week than participants in the group that received the remember-
instruction. In an experiment conducted by  Barnier et al. (2007 ) the forget-
group recalled 11% fewer words from a list than the group that was asked 
to remember the words. It is also worth noting that this effect occurred after 
only a single effort on the part of the participants to voluntarily inhibit the 
retrieval of the said items. Barnier et al. therefore speculate that the repeated 
use of retrieval-inhibition techniques will make it impossible for a subject 
to recall a learned item not only in the short term but also in the long run: 
 Our success in reliably inducing inhibition of recently recalled auto-
biographical memories in the laboratory with a simple, unrepeated 
procedure suggests that in everyday cognition, much more powerful 
effects might be present. Spontaneous and repeated use of a directed 
forgetting procedure on the same knowledge may induce much stronger 
and enduring inhibitory effects. In everyday life, there may be many 
opportunities for repeated directed forgetting, and inhibitory control of 
autobiographical memories may be both common and effective. 
 ( Barnier et al., 2007 , 319, as cited in 
 Matheson, 2013 , 201–202) 
 As was mentioned at the beginning of the section, the standard view has 
it that forgetting cannot be under our control in the sense that there are 
no non-drastic techniques for forgetting specifi c items. When this view is 
combined with the view that blame requires control on the part of the agent, 
then it follows that it is wrong to blame someone for forgetting something. 
This argument is problematic for at least two reasons. First, the studies 
on directed forgetting show that it is sometimes possible to make oneself 
forget something. That said, most forgetting takes place unintentionally and 
involuntary. Second, just because an agent does not have complete control 
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over something she does need not mean that she cannot be blamed for that 
which she does. Moral responsibility may not require control on the part of 
the agent. There will be more on this issue in Section 6. 
 4 Tracing Blame 
 After having discussed techniques that allow us to control our forgetting 
I will now discuss the control we have over our ability to remember at a 
later point in time. There are things we can do to improve the likelihood 
that we will remember them later. Among these techniques is writing 
oneself reminder notes, keeping a calendar, getting enough sleep, and not 
overcrowding one’s memory with useless information. Alternatively one 
can simply think about the thing one wishes to remember later. For the 
less frequently a stored piece of information is retrieved from memory the 
more likely it is that it will be forgotten. As Michaelian notes, “the memory 
system renders records inaccessible (in part) according to their retrieval 
history” ( 2011 : 420). 
 As we saw before, the moral assessment of harmful forgetting crucially 
depends on what led the agent to forget. If the agent did not follow the 
steps we ordinarily follow when we want to make sure that we remember a 
certain piece of information later, then we hold him accountable to a greater 
extent than if the agent did everything in his power to try to remember 
and still forgot.  Prima facie , this is baffl ing. How could it be appropriate 
to blame someone for forgetting something if she does meets neither the 
control nor the awareness condition at the time she forgets? 
 According to the  tracing account an agent can be morally responsible for 
a wrongdoing even if she does not meet the control condition or awareness 
condition at the time of action—provided the action can be causally traced 
back to an earlier choice or action and provided the agent met the control 
and awareness condition at the earlier time. Following H.M.  Smith’s (1983 : 
547) classical terminology, we can say that the tracing interpretation of 
ignorant wrongdoing involves a sequence of two actions: a benighting act 
and a subsequent unwitting wrongful act. The benighting act is one “in which 
the agent fails to improve (or positively impairs) his cognitive position” and 
in virtue of which he subsequently performs the unwitting wrongful act. 
 Talbert (2016 : 141) summarizes the tracing account as follows: 
 Tracing principles help us explain how a person can be responsible 
for an action when, at the time of action, she lacked some element of 
control or knowledge that seems crucial for moral responsibility. We 
substantiate the claim of responsibility in such a case by tracing the 
agent’s lack of control or knowledge back to decisions that were made 
when the agent’s abilities (and/or knowledge) were not compromised. 
Thus, the drunk driver is morally responsible because the actions he 
takes while impaired can be traced back to unimpaired choices. 12 
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 The upshot is that we are blameworthy for our ignorant and unintentional 
conduct if we are blameworthy for our ignorance or unintentionality. 
 To see the tracing theory in action, consider two agents, A and B, who 
have both forgotten the birthdays of their respective partners. But while 
it is the fi rst time that agent A forgot his partner’s birthday, agent B has 
often in the past forgotten the birthday of his partner. Intuitively agent B is 
more blameworthy than agent A because he is, or at least could be, aware 
of his tendency to forget birthdays and is therefore expected to take extra 
precautions to prevent these memory failures from reoccurring. The upshot 
is that if an agent has epistemic access to the fact that he easily forgets birth-
days, then it is reasonable to expect him to take measures that will remind 
him and to actively search for momentarily inaccessible memory items. And 
when he fails to take these extra steps to remember the birthdays of close 
friends and family and then forgets them, he is blameworthy for forgetting. 
The blame can be traced back to an earlier time when the agent knew the 
birthday and had the choice of setting up reminders that would have pre-
vented the forgetting. 
 Needless to say, the degree of blameworthiness for harmful forgetting 
has to do, among other things, with the relationship between the agent and 
the harmed individual(s). To see this reconsider the forgotten birthday case. 
When the person in question is your partner, you are expected to work 
harder to remember her birthday than if she is, say, a distant relative. The 
idea here is that one has special obligations to those to whom one stands in 
some special relationship, e.g., one’s friends, family members, colleagues, 
and those to whom one has made promises or commitments of some sort. 
 The tracing view is a powerful strategy for explaining why it is reasonable 
to hold a wrongdoer morally responsible even if she is not aware of doing 
anything wrong and when she has no control over what she is doing. 
However, it is questionable that the tracing view captures  all cases of 
blameworthy forgetting. A number of authors maintain that there are cases 
of wrongdoing where the agent is intuitively responsible even though the 
wrongdoing cannot be traced back to a past act or omission that grounds 
the agent’s present moral responsibility. Matthew Talbert, for instance, 
holds that “it is at least possible that some forgetful or inattentive agents 
are blameworthy without ever having committed a past culpable action” 
( 2016 : 147). To get a sense for the limits of the tracing account consider the 
following example: 13 
Forgotten Baby . Jill is a single mother of a 7-year-old boy and a 
10-month-old girl. She has to pick up her son from elementary school. 
Usually the baby is at home while she does the school run. However, 
today the babysitter cancelled as Jill is walking out the door, and so 
she takes the baby along. Although it is very hot, the pick-up has 
never taken more than a few minutes, so Jill leaves the sleeping baby 
in the car while she goes to gather her son. This time, however, Jill 
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is greeted by a tangled tale of misbehavior, ill-considered punishment, 
and administrative bungling which requires several hours of indignant 
sorting out. During that time, the baby languishes, forgotten, in the 
locked car. When Jill and her son fi nally make it to the parking lot, they 
fi nd the baby unconscious from heat prostration. 14 
 The fi rst thing to notice about this case is that there is a lot more at 
stake than in the forgotten birthday case discussed earlier. Though it can be 
quite upsetting when a partner forgets one’s birthday, the degree of harm 
infl icted on a person by not remembering her birthday does not compare 
with the degree of harm infl icted on a baby by actively endangering its life. 
Everything else being equal, when there is a lot at stake, we expect the agent 
to take more precautions to not forget the memory item in question than 
when the stakes are low. In a situation where the consequence of forgetting 
something could result in someone’s death, the agent must double and triple 
check to make sure that he has not forgotten. What qualifi es as an adequate 
procedure for remembering the birthdays of friends and family may not 
count as an adequate procedure for remembering things that are more 
important. The importance of a memory item is in part a function of the 
degree of harm caused if the said item is forgotten. 
 At fi rst sight, it might seem that the forgotten baby case is perfectly com-
patible with the tracing account. Jill’s culpability for the baby’s heat stroke 
can be traced back, say, to her culpability for not setting an alarm on her 
cell phone while she is away from the car. Alternatively, we can trace Jill’s 
culpability back to her decision to take the baby on the school run in the 
fi rst place. She should have asked a neighbor to watch her baby while she 
picks up her son from school. It is important to realize, however, that while 
these are perfectly good explanations for why Jill is culpable for endanger-
ing the life of the baby they do  not explain the blameworthiness of Jill’s 
forgetting . To drive this point home, suppose that we trace Jill’s culpability 
for the baby’s heat stroke back to her decision to not set an alarm on her 
cell phone. In this case, we are blaming Jill for intentionally bringing about 
a situation that required her to remember that the baby is in the car. But to 
blame Jill for deciding to rely on her unaided memory is one thing; to blame 
her for failing to remember is quite another. 
 For the trace account to explain the blameworthiness of Jill’s forgetting 
we have to stipulate that Jill knew, or should have known, on the basis of 
past experience, that she easily forgets important things. If she knew this 
about herself and if she nevertheless decided to rely on her unaided memory 
in a life-and-death situation, then and only then can we trace her forgetting 
to what H.M. Smith calls an ‘benighting act,’ i.e., an act the subject has 
awareness of, and control over, and that gives rise to the wrongful act over 
which the subject has no control because she is unaware of committing 
the act. However, if, prior to the wrongful act, Jill’s memory for important 
things had never failed her, then she does not have compelling reasons to 
15032-1019d-1pass-r02.indd   250 08-02-2018   23:20:06
On the Blameworthiness of Forgetting 251
mistrust her ability to remember these things. And if she doesn’t have good 
reasons to mistrust her ability to remember important things, the tracing 
account cannot explain the blameworthiness of her forgetting. In other 
words, the tracing account can explain the blameworthiness of harmful 
forgetting only if it assumed that the subject is, or has good reasons to be, 
aware of the reliability of her memory to be below average. 
 It seems undeniable that there are cases of harmful forgetting where, prior 
to the subject unwittingly committing the wrongful act, she has no good 
reasons to question the reliability of her memory. The  Forgotten Baby case 
can be spelled out to fi t this mold. But this raises the question of how we 
can explain the blameworthiness of cases of harmful forgetting where the 
wrongful act is not traceable to a benighting act? The following two sections 
are concerned with explanations of moral responsibility in nontracing cases 
of forgetting. 
 5 The ‘Rational Man’ vs. You and Me 
 The literature on culpable ignorance contains two accounts of the 
blameworthiness of nontraceable cases of forgetting: the liberalized 
awareness condition of moral responsibility and  attributionism . This section 
is a discussion of the liberalized awareness condition. Attributionism is the 
topic of the following section. 
 We can account for the intuition that Jill is blameworthy for forgetting 
the baby by modifying the awareness condition on moral responsibility. 
According to the version of the awareness condition stated in Section 2, 
an agent is blameworthy for an action only if she is aware of what she is 
doing. Jill doesn’t meet this condition at the time she commits the wrongful 
act because she is oblivious of having left the baby in the parked car. For 
the awareness condition to be applicable to the forgotten baby case the 
condition needs to be strengthened in something like the following way: 
 Liberalized Awareness Condition : S is morally responsible for action 
A only if (i) S is aware of doing A (under the appropriate description)  or 
a rational person in S’s situation would be aware of doing A (under the 
appropriate description) and (ii) S does A at least partly on the basis of 
the belief that A is morally wrong (in the case of a blameworthy action) 
or permissible/obligatory (in the case of a praiseworthy action). 15 
 Applied to the forgotten baby case, the idea is that Jill is blameworthy for 
the baby’s heat stroke because a rational person in her situation would have 
remembered the baby in time. The motivation behind the liberalized aware-
ness condition is expressed in the following quotation: 
 Ignorance, whether circumstantial or normative, is culpable if the agent 
could reasonably have been expected to take measures that would have 
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corrected or avoided it, given his or her capabilities and the opportu-
nities provided by the social context, but failed to do so either due to 
akrasia or due to the culpable, nonakratic exercise of such vices as over-
confi dence, arrogance, dismissiveness, laziness, dogmatism, incuriosity, 
self-indulgence, contempt, and so on. 
 ( FitzPatrick, 2008 , p. 609) 
 The liberalized awareness condition raises two kinds of issues. First, there 
is the issue of what, if anything, a rational person may forget. Second, there 
is the issue of what characterizes a rational person in the agent’s situation 
and how much the rational person would remember in a specifi c situation. 
I will discuss these issues in turn. 
 Forgetting has negative consequences but it also serves valuable 
functions. Forgetting promotes subjective well-being by limiting access to 
negative memories and by reducing unpleasant affect; it orients information 
processing for the present and the future by ensuring that beliefs are current 
and updated; and it provides a basis for obtaining semantic and procedural 
beliefs by allowing for abstraction and automatization ( Nørby, 2015 ). Yet 
despite the fact that forgetting has adaptive value, it might still be irrational. 
The claim that forgetting is irrational is due to John  Broome (2013 : 178), 
who maintains that rationality demands persistence of belief as well as 
persistence of intention. The former requirement states that it is irrational 
to abandon a belief unless one has a suffi cient reason to let go of it. And the 
persistence of intention requirement states that, if you have an intention, 
then it is irrational to stop having that intention without a suffi cient reason. 
Broome further holds that forgetting does not provide a suffi cient reason for 
ceasing to have a certain belief or a certain intention and that the persistence 
conditions therefore require that we do not forget. 
 Broome’s claim that forgetting is irrational rests on the idea that any 
change in an agent’s confi dence with respect to  p must be the result of some 
change in the evidence the agent has for the belief that  p . Given this view, it 
is rational for you to abandon the belief in  p only if you have acquired new 
evidence that suggests that not-p. This position is plausible only in so far 
as we focus on intentional changes in a person’s confi dence with respect to 
 p . But a change in confi dence with respect to  p that is the result of having 
forgotten  p usually takes place unintentionally (cf. Section 3). And to the 
extent that forgetting is a passive mental event, it is not irrational. As  Wil-
liamson (2000 : 219) states: “[unintentional] forgetting is not irrational; it is 
just unfortunate.” A rational agent may not intentionally forget anything, 
but he may unintentionally forget something. Rationality does not require 
perfect memory. 
 Granted that unintentional forgetting is not irrational, the question arises 
of how much a rational person would remember in a specifi c situation. 
According to the liberalized awareness condition, an agent is responsible 
for the harm that arises from his having forgotten something if a rational 
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person would have remembered the thing in question. Another way of put-
ting this point is to say that an agent is blameworthy for the harm caused by 
his forgetting  p if, had he actively searched for  p in his memory, he would 
have been able to recall  p . The problem, however, is to give a general specifi -
cation of the kinds of activities an agent has to undergo to qualify as having 
actively searched for a memory item. In Section 4, we saw that the kinds 
of activities that we expect an agent to engage in so as to recall something 
depend, among other things, on the importance of the memory item (where 
the importance is a function of the degree of harm caused if the said item is 
forgotten). The point is that I don’t see how we could say with any reason-
able degree of precision what kinds of memory-jogging activities a rational 
person (as opposed to you and me) would engage in so as to remember 
something and how much the rational person would be able to remember. 
Yet the fact that the proposal under consideration can’t give a defi nite ver-
dict even in a simplifi ed hypothetical case like  Forgotten Baby seems to be a 
good reason to rule it out. 
 6 Attributability vs. Control 
 Let us step back and remind ourselves of where we are in the dialectical 
structure. We started out explaining the blameworthiness of harmful 
forgetting by tracing it to an earlier act the subject had awareness of and 
control over. The earlier act gives rise to the unwitting forgetting over 
which the subject has no control. We saw that the problem with the tracing 
account is that it can only explain the blameworthiness of forgetting if it is 
assumed that the agent is, or has good reasons to be, aware of the reliability 
of her memory to be below average. This gave rise to the question of how 
to account for the blameworthiness of forgetting in cases where the tracing 
account does not get a foothold because the subject has no good reasons 
to question the reliability of her memory. One strategy is to weaken the 
awareness condition so that it is met by the subject while she forgets the 
item in question and brings about harm. Another strategy, to be discussed in 
this section, is to develop a notion of moral responsibility that is completely 
independently of the awareness and control conditions. If it can be shown 
that moral responsibility requires neither awareness nor control, then 
it would seem that the moral assessment of harmful forgetting poses no 
special problem. 
 Attributionism is the view that agents need not meet the control and 
awareness conditions to be properly blamed or praised for their behavior. 
According to attributionism, for an agent to be blameworthy for his wrong-
doing all that is needed is that the behavior is attributable to the agent and 
to his orientation toward other people. An action is attributable to the agent 
if it is expressive of his emotional reactions, spontaneous attitudes, and val-
ues. Even though the emotional reactions and attitudes are nonvoluntary 
they give a good insight into the agent’s moral personality. Sometimes the 
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picture provided by these reactions and attitudes is even better than that 
provided by the agent’s voluntary actions, which may be performed for stra-
tegic reasons so as to disguise his real feelings. 16 
 To see attributionism at work, consider once again the forgotten birth-
day case. Forgetting one’s partner’s birthday is usually not the product 
of an act that is intentionally aimed at bringing about the memory lapse. 
Moreover, if the subject has never before forgotten about his partner’s 
birthday then, prior to the incident, he has no good reason to doubt his 
ability to remember the birthday without relying on external tools such 
as calendar entries. But if he has no good reasons to question his ability 
to remember his partner’s birthday, then the tracing account doesn’t get a 
foothold. To the extent that we think that the memory lapse is neverthe-
less blameworthy we have to resort to an account of blameworthiness that 
differs from the tracing account. According to attributionism, the memory 
lapse is blameworthy if it is expressive of the agent’s orientation toward 
other people, in this case his partner. It would, for example, be expressive 
of the agent’s orientation toward his partner if he generally didn’t care 
much about her and if he neither acknowledged his fault nor apologized 
upon learning about the memory lapse. If the agent didn’t feel the need to 
apologize, he would manifest disregard toward the way his actions affect 
his partner’s feelings. 
 Sher (2009: 24) illustrates attributionism by means of an example of a 
dog (as opposed to a baby) being forgotten in a parked car by its owner 
called Alessandra. Sher labels this case  Hot Dog . Alessandra, Sher argues, 
is blameworthy for the dog’s heat stroke but the reason she is blameworthy 
is not (as the tracing view would have it) that she “negligently failed to do 
something that would have prevented her from forgetting [the dog]” (2009 : 
36). Instead Alessandra is blameworthy for harming the dog because her 
behavior has fallen below the standard of care a dog owner owes to her 
pet and because the behavior is refl ective of an underlying blameworthy 
evaluative attitude. Sher writes: “if . . . Alessandra were less solicitous of 
her children, or was made less anxious by confl ict—then she would not 
have forgotten about the dog” ( 2009 : 92). Thus for the attributionist to be 
able to ascribe blame in a case of harmful forgetting he has to argue that the 
harmful behavior is representative of the agent’s moral character in general 
and her orientation toward the harmed individual in particular. 
 There are no doubt cases where the attributionist strategy is appropriate; 
but there are also instances of harmful forgetting where the agent’s orienta-
tion toward other people leaves nothing to be desired. To see this consider 
a version of  Hot Dog where Alessandra loves her dog dearly and where she 
has, up to the incidence, been a model dog owner. The attributionist strategy 
seems  ad hoc in cases where an agent has no history of wrongdoings of the 
specifi c kind and where the harmful behavior does not fi t with the agent’s 
overall character. Why should we have to accuse Alessandra of being too 
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solicitous of her children or of not genuinely loving her dog just so that we 
can blame her for the one time she has forgets the dog in the car? Why do we 
have to suppose that the wrongdoing is always refl ective of the agent’s char-
acter? The worry is that the attributionist account of the blameworthiness 
of forgetting may tempt us to misinterpret the agent’s moral character for 
the sake of being able to attribute blame for the wrongdoing she committed. 
 7 Conclusion 
 It is a mistake to think that we cannot be morally responsible for forgetting 
because, as a matter of principle, forgetting is outside of our control. Some-
times we do have control over our forgetting. When forgetting is under our 
control there is no question that it is the proper object of praise and blame. 
But we can also be morally responsible for forgetting something when it is 
beyond our control that we forget that thing. The literature contains three 
accounts of the blameworthiness of forgetting over which the agent has no 
control—the tracing account, the liberalized awareness condition, and attri-
butionism. The point of the chapter was to examine each of these accounts 
and spell out the pros and cons. Even though these are competing accounts 
of the blameworthiness of harmful forgetting they are compatible with one 
another. In particular, it is possible to come up with a position that endorses 
the tracing account for certain kinds of harmful forgetting and attribution-
ism for other kinds of harmful forgetting. But this combination of the trac-
ing account and attributionism is the topic of another chapter. 17 
 Notes 
 1 For a conceptual analysis of forgetting, see Frise (2018). 
 2 Paired-associate learning involves the pairing of two items (usually words)—a 
stimulus and a response. For example, words such as ‘candle’ (stimulus) and 
‘table’ (response) may be paired, and when the learner is prompted with the 
stimulus (‘candle’), he responds with the appropriate word (‘table’). 
 3 In Section 5, we will see that proponents of attributionism challenge the idea 
that moral responsibility requires awareness. 
 4 This condition is modeled after Haji (2008: 90). 
 5 The control and the awareness conditions of moral responsibility are, of course, 
connected in the sense that if an agent does not know what she is doing, then she 
does not have (complete) control over her behavior (Talbert, 2016, 154 n10). 
 6 Harm brought about by forgetting is, of course, not the only putative counter-
example to the awareness condition of moral responsibility. Forgetting is a kind 
of ignorance. Besides forgetting ignorance can be brought about by intoxication, 
distraction, fatigue, and intense emotions such as rage. 
 7 The notion of an epistemically non-drastic technique for forgetting is borrowed 
from Matheson (2013, pp. 197–8). 
 8 Cf. Caine et al. (1981), King (1992), Pastalkova et al. (2006), and Shema et al. 
(2007), all cited in Liao (2017, p. 374). 
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 9 See Pitman et al. (2002) and Vaiva et al. (2003). For a discussion of the ethical 
issues connected with the use of beta-blockers for curing PTSD see Evers (2007) 
and Kober (2006). 
 10 See Bjork (1989, Bjork and Bjork (1996), and MacLeod (1998). The description 
of the experiment is taken from El Haj et al., 2011, p. 994. 
 11 MacLeod (1998) claims that sometimes list 1 forgetting occurs without an 
enhancement of the memory for items of list 2. 
 12 Talbert (2016, pp. 130–141) distinguishes between different versions of the trac-
ing view. For a discussion of tracing views see: Peels (2011), H.M. Smith (2011), 
Timpe (2011), and Vargas (2005). 
 13 This example is modeled after an example by Sher (2009: 24). In Sher’s example, 
it is a dog instead of a baby that is forgotten in the car. 
 14 Since 1998, 376 children have died in the U.S. of heatstroke because they were 
forgotten by caregivers in cars (see  http://noheatstroke.org/ ). The psychologist 
David Diamond talks about the  forgotten baby syndrome . According to Dia-
mond, when people perform habitual actions, they operate on autopilot. When 
in fact things are different, the brain creates an alternative reality that matches 
how things usually are when the person engages in a habitual action. The tragic 
memory lapse dubbed ‘forgotten baby syndrome’ occurs when an agent is guided 
by that alternative reality (see  http://psychology.usf.edu/faculty/data/ddiamond/
baby-sy.pdf ). 
 15 The concept of a reasonably intelligent and impartial person goes back to antiq-
uity (cf. Lucas, 1963). Component (i) of the liberalized awareness condition is 
similar to Vargas’ formulation of the awareness condition: “For an agent to be 
responsible for some outcome (whether an action or consequence) the outcome 
must be reasonably foreseeable for that agent at some suitable prior time” (Var-
gas, 2005, p. 274). 
 16 H.M. Smith, 2011, pp. 118–9; Talbert, 2016, pp. 52–61. Among the propo-
nents of attributionism are Frankfurt (1988), Scanlon (1998), Sher (2009), and 
A. Smith (2005). The negation of attributionism is called  volitionism . Among 
the proponents of volitionism are Sidgwick (1907, p. 59–61), Taylor (1970, 
pp. 241–52), and Wallace (1994, pp. 131–2). 
 17 For comments on a previous draft and for conversations related to the topic of 
the paper I am deeply grateful to Maura Priest and two anonymous reviewers. 
I would also like to acknowledge the fi nancial support from an Alexander-von-
Humboldt Professorship Award. 
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